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T H E  U K  E N E R G Y  R E S E A R C H  C E N T R E  
 
The UK Energy Research Centre carries out world-class research into sustainable 
future energy systems. 
 
It is the hub of UK energy research and the gateway between the UK and the 
international energy research communities. Our interdisciplinary, whole systems 
research informs UK policy development and research strategy. 
 
www.ukerc.ac.uk 
 
The Meeting Place - hosting events for the whole of the UK energy research community - 
www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/TheMeetingPlace 
National Energy Research Network - a weekly newsletter containing news, jobs, event, 
opportunities and developments across the energy field - www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/NERN 
Research Atlas - the definitive information resource for current and past UK energy research 
and development activity -  http://ukerc.rl.ac.uk/ 
UKERC Publications Catalogue - all UKERC publications and articles available online, via 
www.ukerc.ac.uk 
  
Follow us on Twitter @UKERCHQ 
 
This document has been prepared to enable results of on-going work to be made 
available rapidly. It has not been subject to review and approval, and does not have 
the authority of a full Research Report. 
 
 
 
UKERC is undertaking two flagship projects to draw together research undertaken 
during Phase II of the programme. This working paper is an output of the Energy 
Strategy under Uncertainty flagship project which aims: 
 
 To generate, synthesise and communicate evidence about the range and nature 
of the risks and uncertainties facing UK energy policy and the achievement of its 
goals relating to climate change, energy security and affordability. 
 To identify, using rigorous methods, strategies for mitigating risks and managing 
uncertainties for both public policymakers and private sector strategists. 
 
The project includes five work streams: i) Conceptual framing, modelling and 
communication, ii) Energy supply and network infrastructure, iii) Energy demand,         
iv) Environment and resources and v) Empirical synthesis. This working paper is part 
of the output from the Environment and resources work stream. 
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Executive Summary 
 
In the UK there are strong policy imperatives to transition toward low-carbon energy 
systems. The Carbon Plan (DECC, 2011) represents the current key policy document 
that sets out the UK Government’s proposals for energy system change necessary to 
meet the carbon budgets enshrined in the Climate Change Act (2008); within this 
document public attitudes and acceptability are identified as key uncertainties with 
regard to the development of future energy systems. In particular, it is highlighted 
that there is little agreement over how to transform the energy system in order to 
meet climate change targets. 
 
In this paper, public acceptability is identified as an indeterminate form of 
uncertainty that presents particular challenges for policy making. We build on our 
existing research into public values for energy system change (see Parkhill et al. 
2013) to explore how the outcomes of the project can be applied in thinking through 
the uncertainties associated with public perspectives. 
 
To inform our analysis, we draw on concepts of uncertainty and framing arising from 
the work of Leach et al. (2010) whereby they argue for the importance of engaging 
with a wide range of different framings in order to better anticipate inevitable shocks 
that arise from systemic uncertainties. We highlight how the range of public values 
identified through our research bring into view alternative and quite different 
problem and solution framings to those currently evident within UK policy. 
 
In concluding, we argue that incorporating insights into public values within policy 
framings can offer a basis for better understanding and anticipating public 
responses to energy system change, ultimately aiding in managing the complex set 
of uncertainties associated with public acceptability. 
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1. Introduction 
In the 2011 Carbon Plan the UK Government set out pathways for major energy 
system change required to meet the 2050 80% climate change target and carbon 
budgets enshrined in the Climate Change Act (2008). Within this document 
transitions are recognised as entailing multiple different forms of uncertainty. One 
such set of uncertainties is identified as pertaining to public attitudes and 
acceptability. In particular, the notion that there appears to be little agreement over 
how to meet climate change targets is highlighted and the need to achieve a 
coalition for change between publics, government and industry to deal with this 
uncertainty is signalled as highly important (Department of Energy and Climate 
Change, DECC, 2011). 
 
Despite recognition of the need for public support, the envisioned pathways within 
the Carbon Plan are constructed from the perspective of experts and policy makers 
with only relatively limited reflection on the current state of public views. Significant 
uncertainties thus remain regarding ‘public pathways’ for energy system change, the 
extent to which these are commensurate with policy visions, and what the 
implications of contrasting perspectives might be in creating a coalition for change.  
 
This paper builds on our research into public values for energy system change to 
explore how the approach and outcomes of the project can be applied in thinking 
about uncertainties associated with public responses and engagement in the context 
of system transitions currently proposed within UK policy. Here we use the term 
‘values’ to refer to the more general concerns which underlay specific responses and 
denote them as representing salient cultural resources (Douglas and Wildavsky, 
1982) that people draw upon in forming their preferences. To illustrate by reference 
to our research we found that a strong public preference for solar energy was 
underpinned by a perception that it is ‘renewable’ ‘fair’, ‘just’ and ‘clean’. We argue 
that what is important in terms of public preferences, then, is why they favour 
something rather than what it is they favour because were solar energy deployed in a 
way inconsistent with these underlying beliefs, it would likely no longer be supported 
or acceptable.  
 
Recent analyses have highlighted the limitations of conventional expert-led 
approaches to decision-making in situations where indeterminate uncertainty and 
incomplete knowledge can be recognized to prevail (Leach et al. 2010). Key to the 
argument we put forward in this paper is that public acceptability represents a form 
of indeterminate uncertainty where incomplete knowledge means that responses that 
can never be predicted or known fully in advance. This is not to say, however, that 
nothing can be known about public acceptability but that an alternative approach to 
understanding and decision-making is required to anticipate and build resilience 
with regards to inevitable shocks related to public acceptability outcomes.  
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Central to creating such an alternative approach is an understanding of the ways that 
different people and groups value different aspects of systems and goals or 
outcomes, and frame the issues in fundamentally different ways (Leach et al. 2010; 
see also Miller, 2000; Bickerstaff et al. 2008; Butler et al. 2013). In the context of 
current UK energy policy relatively narrow framings result in a narrower range of 
options being considered, reducing the ability for responses to account for the 
complex and dynamic realities associated with public acceptability. Here, we will 
argue that a focus on public values can provide a basis for an approach that can be 
used to interrogate different framings and contingencies, building understanding of 
a wider range of problem framings and responses and thus bringing improved 
potential for tackling inherent uncertainties.   
  
The research, on which this paper builds, developed a synthesis analysis revealing 
the core values and framings that underlie public perspectives on energy system 
transformation (see Parkhill et al. 2013). This project involved three interlinked 
phases of empirical research. First, energy system scenario analysis and interviews 
with key stakeholders were undertaken to form an understanding of policy and 
expert perspectives on energy system change. Second, in order to develop insight 
into public values for energy system change, two major phases of research were 
undertaken with members of the British public. Specifically, a series of in-depth 
deliberative workshops held with publics in England, Scotland and Wales (participant 
n=68), and a nationally representative online survey (Great Britain, participant 
n=2,441). Both of these phases of research utilised an energy system scenario tool 
as a basis for engaging members of the public with the notion of whole energy 
system change – namely the DECC my2050 tool1. The my2050 tool represents a 
simplified version of the UK’s energy system and interactively shows the impact of 
different system changes on carbon emissions targets and energy security aims (see 
http://my2050.decc.gov.uk/).  
 
A synthesis analysis was undertaken for the deliberative workshops and survey data 
in order to develop insights that best explained the data as a whole, and provided a 
coherent account of public responses to energy system change. This was an iterative 
process involving examining and re-examining, comparing and dissecting data via 
discussions amongst the research team. The findings with regards to public values 
were the result of closely examining both the similarities and differences within and 
between the datasets. The insights regarding public values derived from this 
research thus extended beyond examination of preferences offering a deeper level of 
insight that can be utilised as a basis for understanding emergent public responses 
and engagement.  Though the research did reveal preferences and identify the key 
system elements more likely to provoke public contestation (e.g. fossil fuels, CCS), 
by setting out public values for system change the project went beyond this to 
                                               
1 The my2050 tool was developed by the digital democracy company Delib for the UK 
Department of Energy and Climate Change and Sciencwise-ERC. The tool is publically available 
here: www.my2050.decc.gov.uk. 
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deliver insight into the deeper ideals and concerns that underpin processes of 
preference formation. Planning will always involve uncertainties, especially when 
dealing with complex, dynamic systems in which multiple actors and contingencies 
are involved. However, we assert that understanding public values for energy system 
change brings possibilities for interpreting, explaining and potentially anticipating 
public responses as they evolve and unfold over time.   
 
In this paper we examine in greater depth how insights into public values can help 
policy-makers in understanding and engaging with uncertainties associated with 
public acceptability for energy system change. In the following we first set out key 
aspects of policy engagement with public acceptability and current policy approaches 
to managing uncertainty in this context. We then move to discuss how we might 
conceptualise uncertainty with regards to public acceptability before going on to 
illustrate the utility of a values based approach for engaging with uncertainties 
associated with public acceptability and support. We conclude by critically examining 
notions of public acceptability, and assumptions that appear to underlay some 
existing approaches to engagement. We propose that uncertainties relating to public 
acceptability may be engaged with more effectively by giving attention to core 
underlying public values in the construction of both energy system problems and 
solutions. Moreover, we argue that understanding public values is likely to be central 
to achieving a coalition for change as a potentially important part of delivering 
transitions. 
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2. Policy in Conditions of Uncertainty: 
Scenarios and visions for energy system 
change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within the Carbon Plan the UK Government sets out its key policy scenario and 
approach to delivering energy system transition, identifying the significance of 
public support for the successful delivery of many core elements of change (DECC, 
2011). The key drivers for energy system transitions are characterised as being 
climate change and specifically the carbon targets as defined within the Climate 
Change Act (2008), energy security characterised in terms of national security of 
supply, and cost effectiveness which is to be attained through market mechanisms. 
The imperatives for transitions are thus situated in these terms with implications for 
the proposed solutions. For example, the importance of cost effectiveness means 
that a cost optimised scenario forms the primary focus of policy despite the 
inclusion of other scenarios (not cost optimised) to account for other aspects of 
uncertainty (such as in public responses and engagement). Cost optimisation also 
sits at the heart of the government’s proposed approach to transitions, which 
focuses on the development of effective market competition between low-carbon 
options.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is recognition that government intervention will be required in order to bring 
low-carbon technological options into competition with one another, since the 
current market will ultimately favour unabated fossil fuels as long as carbon is not 
taken into account in an effective way. For this reason the government proposes 
intervention up to 2020 to bring Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), Renewable 
Energy Technologies (RETs) and nuclear energy into effective market competition. In 
this sense the government does not set out any firm vision for change, such as 80% 
renewable energy by 2050 – as is the case within the German Energiewende 
“This plan shows that the UK can move to a sustainable low-carbon economy 
without sacrificing living standards, but by investing in new cars, power stations 
and buildings. However, it will require the public to accept new infrastructure and 
changes to the way in which we heat homes, and to be prepared to invest in 
energy efficiency that will save money over time.” (DECC, 2011) 
“While the overall direction is clear, major uncertainties remain over both the most 
cost effective mix of technologies and the pace of transition. The Government is 
committed to ensuring that the low-carbon technologies with the lowest costs will 
win the largest market share.” (DECC, 2011) 
5 
 
UK Energy Research Centre                                            UKERC/WP/FG/2014/006 
 
(Bundesregierung Deutschland, 2010) – because ultimately the market will decide the 
share of any particular low-carbon technological option.  
 
The major tenets of the Carbon Plan are thus formulated as being nuclear, fossil 
fuels (principally gas) with CCS and RETs on the supply side and high reductions in 
demand achieved through greater efficiency and the introduction of heat pumps and 
networks, electric vehicles and so forth on the demand side. The exact share of these 
different elements is of course extremely variable but in order to offer some 
indication of a cost-effective route to change MARKAL modelling is employed to 
produce a plausible scenario to 2050. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ‘core’ MARKAL run produced a cost optimised scenario for 2050 that in essence 
entails 33 Giga Watts (GW) of nuclear energy, 28 GW of fossil fuels with CCS, and 45 
GW of RETs including bioenergy. This supply side scenario is combined with 50% 
(26-43% to achieve 80% target) reductions in demand on 2011 levels to be achieved 
through the development of heat pumps and heat networks, energy efficiency (e.g. 
insulation), battery electric and fuel cell vehicles, and reduced use of private vehicles. 
Though this is stated as representing only one scenario for change it is translated 
into more concrete form through the carbon budgets, which detail key abatement 
scenarios through particular time points (e.g. 2023 -2027). The carbon budgets 
provide benchmarks towards the 2050 target in order to ensure that regular 
progress is being made and provide a level of predictability for UK firms and 
households to plan and invest for a low-carbon economy (Committee on Climate 
Change, CCC, 2014). Currently the UK is in its second carbon budget period (2013-
2017) but abatement scenarios that follow the through lines of the Carbon Plan are 
in place up to the 4th carbon budget (2023-2027).   
 
From looking at both the Carbon Plan and carbon budgets we can see that high 
levels of fossil fuels remain within the system in 2050. In terms of the timing of CCS 
deployment fossil fuels would remain unabated as CCS is retrofitted through 2025-
2030 being developed for commercial deployment within the current decade and 
early 2020s (DECC, 2012; CCC, 2013). Gas is expected to continue to dominate the 
market for heating until 2030 as penetration of low-carbon heat technologies 
develops (DECC, 2012; CCC, 2013). It is clear that significant public uptake of new 
transport and heating solutions are essential to meeting the goals, as is public 
acceptance of the proposed low-carbon supply solutions i.e. bioenergy, wind, solar 
and other RETS, nuclear and fossil fuels with CCS. In general questions are identified 
as remaining around how publics are likely to respond to proposed increases in 
“Attempting to pick a single pathway to 2050 by relying on a single model is 
neither possible nor a helpful guide in the face of great uncertainty. But it does 
give insight into the most cost effective way to achieve the low-carbon transition, 
illustrating the technologies likely to contribute to reducing emissions, and the 
most cost effective timing for their deployment.” (DECC, 2011) 
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nuclear energy facilities, whether electric cars and new forms of heating systems will 
be acceptable, the extent to which increased use of biofuels will be regarded 
un/favourably, how Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is likely to be received, and, 
crucially, which combinations of system changes are likely to garner the greatest or 
least support.  It is possible, however, to see multiple other inter-related areas of 
uncertainty that are less technologically focused such as those regarding the public 
acceptability of different means for financing transitions, governance arrangements, 
and questions around which approaches to the processes of change are likely to 
garner support or increase the likelihood of contestation.  
 
Within policy the extent to which members of the public are likely to accept and 
enact various aspects of transitions is thus identified as a key area of remaining 
uncertainty (Eyre et al. 2011). A key way of addressing this uncertainty is to run 
alternative scenario pathways to the core cost optimised pathway. These scenarios 
incorporate additional assumptions with regard to costs, public responses, and 
technology development. For example, the alternative scenario entitled “Higher 
nuclear, less energy efficiency” explores the outcome of CCS not becoming 
commercially viable, offshore wind and solar showing no significant cost reductions, 
and low public acceptability of energy efficiency measures. This represents an 
important means of engaging with uncertainty, however, we argue that such an 
approach does not by itself provide a basis for grappling with the complexity and 
contingency that is endemic to understanding public responses and acceptability. 
Ultimately, in tackling uncertainties about public acceptability the government 
highlights the importance of what it terms a coalition for change stating that ‘to 
make this transition, industry, the Government and the public need to be pulling in 
the same direction’ (DECC, 2012). This process of establishing a coalition is likely to 
be particularly difficult without more in-depth forms of engagement with public 
views.   
 
This policy background represents, then, the context for our argument and forms an 
important precursor to the following discussion. As we move forward now we take as 
our starting point discussion of how we can best conceptualise the form of 
uncertainty that arises in the area of public acceptability in order to facilitate further 
analysis.
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3. Conceptualising Uncertainty: Public values, 
uncertainty and indeterminacy 
 
Uncertainty has been defined and conceptualised in a number of different ways 
ranging from statistical and modelling based approaches which generally focus on a 
quantification of uncertainty through to typologies and definitions that lend 
themselves more to qualitative analysis (Pidgeon et al., 1992; Adam and Groves, 
2008; Stirling, 2008). Given the nature of this paper we focus on approaches that 
aim to define uncertainty, offering typologies and broader conceptual tools for 
thinking about uncertainty in complex policy contexts. We draw, in particular, on 
Brian Wynne’s (1992) distinction between different forms of uncertainty and on the 
work of the Sussex STEPS centre - Social, Technological and Environmental Pathways 
to Sustainability (see Leach et al. 2007; Stirling et al. 2007; Leach et al. 2010), 
applying these ideas together with our own research into public values to set out 
conceptual foundations for the subsequent analysis.  
 
Several authors have defined uncertainty in comparison to other categories of 
knowledge (for example, see Smithson, 1989; Wynne 1992; Callon et al. 2009). In 
Wynne’s (1992) work he develops such an approach distinguishing between risk and 
uncertainty but also incorporating categories of ignorance and indeterminacy. For 
Wynne, as for others, risk refers to a knowledge context where ‘the system is well 
known and the chances of different outcomes can be quantified by structured 
analysis of mechanisms and probabilities’ (1992: 114). 
 
Uncertainty refers to contexts where the system parameters are known but not the 
probability distributions. Ignorance refers to an endemic form of uncertainty which 
pertains to the necessity to set boundaries around the questions that are asked the 
uncertainties that are examined meaning that some uncertainties are always 
exogenized and thus become invisible (Wynne, 1992 - see also Collingridge, 1980; 
Smithson, 1989).  Wynne suggests, however, that this only becomes problematic 
when commitments to act are built on knowledge as if the endemic limitations that 
result in ignorance do not exist (1992: 114). 
 
Indeterminacy is for Wynne also fundamentally related to the process of knowledge 
production and refers to a context where the causal chains and networks are 
inherently open but decision-making proceeds as if they are not; as if it is still 
possible to diminish uncertainty through further knowledge creation. In the case of 
indeterminacy causation, proof and choice all arise as problematic as there is no 
scientific means of establishing causality. Moreover, the factors and parameters 
salient to the emergent outcomes are largely unknown and unpredictable; they do 
not merely lack definition in a cause and effect system but are open-ended in the 
sense that outcomes depend on how a whole range intermediate actors will behave 
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(Wynne, 1992; also Butler, 2008). This severely limits the ability to generate 
probabilistic estimates of future(s) on which decisions can be based.  
 
We argue here that public acceptability belongs to the category of indeterminacy in 
that the responses of publics do not merely lack definition within a cause-effect 
system but interact dynamically with multiple other developments and occurrences. 
This does not mean, however, that nothing can be known about public acceptability 
in any given context but that the approach to engaging with uncertainty in this area 
must deliver a basis for interrogation and exploration of multiple different 
contingencies. We suggest here that focusing on broad public values for energy 
system change rather than specific responses provides the basis for such an 
approach. Values are defined in the research as broad ‘cultural resources’ (Douglas 
and Wildavsky, 1982) that people draw upon in formulating their preferences and 
responses (see Demski et al., in preparation). Once the pertinent values for any 
particular issue are understood they can be utilised to interrogate the different ways 
in which they are likely to interact with other developments and processes in 
combination.  
 
In their work addressing decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, Leach et 
al. (2007; 2010) have argued that conventional approaches are often poorly adapted 
to account for the challenges associated with complex dynamic systems where 
indeterminacy can be inherent. They point to the frequent focus on risk that tends to 
result in other forms of uncertainty being obscured and to emphasis being placed on 
attempts to control short term shocks, rather than adapting to short and long term 
changes by building resilience and robustness. For Leach et al. central to creating an 
alternative approach to decision making with uncertainty is an understanding of the 
ways that different people and groups value different aspects of systems and goals 
or outcomes, framing the issues in fundamentally different ways. 
 
In contexts where only a narrow range of possible values are taken into account, 
analyses and responses are constrained from the outset – their very design and 
organisation means that system dynamics, uncertainty, and multiple perspectives 
and goals are not sufficiently considered and addressed. This results in too narrow a 
range of options being considered and reduces the ability for responses to be 
properly tailored to inevitable changes and surprises that will emerge over time (see 
Leach et al. 2007; Stirling et al. 2007). These ideas have particular resonance for the 
following analysis where we will we argue for the need to incorporate and address 
public values as a precursor for engaging with uncertainty about public acceptability 
and a necessary process to developing a coalition for change. We suggest that the 
notion of building a coalition for change could be seen as representing a basis for 
resilience and robustness but that the conditions and approaches necessary to 
develop such a basis are not yet evident within political and policy cultures.   
 
In the following we argue that insight into different value sets brings possibilities for 
anticipating surprises and engaging with uncertainties. This is because values, unlike 
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more specific preferences, provide a basis for careful reflection on different forms of 
change, in different contexts and, crucially, with different forms of interconnection, 
rather than offering a determinate prescription of what the public response will be to 
any one change.  In the following analysis we aim to illustrate this by using the value 
set identified in the research to explore public acceptability issues with regards to 
current policy plans and approaches. As highlighted above, important for this is the 
concept of framing as different understandings of system dynamics and the different 
aspects of a system that are valued produce different problem framings and, 
subsequently, different solutions (Leach et al., 2007). 
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4. Understanding Emergent Un/certainties: 
Values and Framing in Public and Policy Energy 
Futures 
 
As highlighted in the introduction a central focus of the research which we will draw 
on in this analysis was to go beyond a description of public preferences and views to 
understand the core values that underlay public responses to proposed energy 
system change. 
 
In examining public perspectives on complex socio-technical issues it is widely 
acknowledged that there is a need to examine what underpins people’s views as it 
gives insight into the more general positions that underlie particular concerns. Put 
another way, if one is to understand emergent public attitudes, it is necessary to pay 
attention to the ‘underlying frameworks and dynamics that are likely to structure 
their development and evolution’ (Macnaghten, 2010, p.24). The public values 
pertaining to energy system change identified from our datasets thus represent a set 
of general positions that underlay the particular concerns that people held.  
 
Values that were identified as core to the formulation of public views about energy 
system change can be summarised as follows: 
x Efficiency and not wasting - in sum, being more efficient (doing more with 
less) and minimising waste and overall energy usage is almost universally 
seen as positive. 
x Protection of environment and nature - in sum, being environmentally 
conscious and respectful of nature through minimising intrusive and 
destructive processes. 
x Ensuring security and stability - in sum, making sure the energy system is 
safe, reliable and accessible to citizens, both in terms of personal 
affordability and national availability. 
x Autonomy and power - in sum, being mindful of the importance of autonomy 
and freedom both at national and personal levels. Social justice and fairness - 
in sum, developing energy systems in ways that are open, transparent and 
fair and attentive to the effects on people’s abilities to lead healthy lives. 
x Improvement and quality - in sum, thinking in terms of long term 
trajectories, ensuring changes represent improvement and considering their 
implications for quality of life (see Parkhill et al. 2013; Demski et al. in 
preparation). 
 
These represent the range of values that underpin people’s preferences and 
perceptions and give insight to how publics think things should be with regards to 
energy system change. They are not values held necessarily by any one individual, 
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nor universally by all, rather they represent, as highlighted earlier, prevalent 
identifiable cultural resources (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) that people draw upon 
in forming their preferences for different aspects of energy system change. 
 
The normative basis of the values means that they give insight into both how 
public(s) view the problem of energy system change and how they view the solutions. 
They thus offer an alternative set of framings to those central to expert and policy 
perspectives on system change. In the following analysis we first focus on examining 
the implications of the value system for problem framings. We compare the values 
derived from our research with the public against the current policy problem 
framings in order to show how drawing in these values highlights a much wider 
frame for engaging with system dynamics and uncertainties and thus considering 
possible responses. 
 
Through the following discussion we use some illustrative data points in the form of 
quotes and statistics from the deliberative workshops and survey undertaken for the 
research (see the introduction to the paper for discussion of the methods). The full 
empirical basis for the value-set found within the research is reported elsewhere (see 
Parkhill et al. 2013; Demski et al. in preparation). Here the intention is to explore the 
application of the value-set as an outcome of the research for thinking about 
uncertainty pertaining to public acceptability in whole energy system change.   
 
In policy we find clearly defined concerns about climate change, energy security, and 
cost effectiveness focused on specific aspects of these issues as outlined earlier (e.g. 
meeting the UKs 80% reduction target for 2050). In engaging publics with the 
prospect of energy system transitions as they are currently formulated within policy, 
they bring a much wider range of issues to the fore. These are reflected in the values 
described above and include issues such as the way that the energy system is at 
present privately owned and financed, operating within a market system which is 
seen as failing to operate properly on its own terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This particular set of issues relate centrally to the values of Social Justice and 
Fairness and Autonomy and Power. Here the problem of energy systems is one which 
incorporates concern about the particular nature of the market led system and its 
perceived under-regulation. It is clear that though cost-effectiveness is central to the 
Participant 1: “…part of the problem is that they have opened up the market place 
and the market place now dictates what we pay whereas before it was centralised 
and government-led and a fair price for all, now we swap and the next week they 
put their prices up and you wish you stayed with that one” 
Participant 2: “I think it does need to be uniform because at the minute we are 
playing in a monopoly and we are losing because they are getting mega big bucks 
from the profits” 
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policy problem framing and though political discourse in general does engage with 
some aspects of these values (e.g. through strategies to address fuel poverty), these 
matters are not regarded as central to that which should be addressed through 
energy system transformation. Within current Coalition policy at least the relatively 
narrowly defined terms for energy system change do not problematize current 
market arrangements in the ways that publics consistently did.  
 
Publics further situate climate change as just one element within a much wider set of 
concerns about environment and human/nature relations, as encapsulated in the 
value Protection of Environment and Nature.  This value encompasses the notion that 
the energy system should contribute to (or at least not detract from) the general 
healthiness and wellbeing of the environment – including society and the biosphere.  
As such, policy imperatives principally focused on climate change rather than wider 
environmental concerns fail to bring into view important – to the public – additional 
environmental contexts and issues. The issue that arises with the narrower problem 
framings found in policy contexts is that the capacity for considering a fuller range 
of responses and for anticipating inevitable shocks within public responses is 
considerably reduced.     
 
Energy security is also incorporated in public framings as is cost (effectiveness), 
though the focus in terms of these issues differs from policy once again in two key 
ways. First, energy security is situated as part of a set of concerns about Security and 
Stability but in contrast to policy which locates it at the national level and in terms of 
energy supply, for the public energy security is primarily located at the personal 
level.  Specifically, for the public, security and stability is connected to the ability to 
maintain system function – such as taking children to school, eating, going to 
hospital – while undergoing change (see Leach, 2008). In this regard it further 
incorporates issues of cost and energy affordability, i.e. people place emphasis on 
their ability to afford to use energy and gain access to energy services rather than on 
securing national supplies (e.g. of fossil fuels).  
 
Second, cost is of high concern for publics but this is not related to solely to market 
price and cost effectiveness, rather the issues are situated within the broader frame 
of affordability. In situating concern about costs in terms of affordability a wider and 
different range of solutions to cost issues come into view, such as subsidies for low 
income households and developments to ensure cost stability over and above lowest 
cost possible. It is worth adding to this that energy is not currently viewed as 
particularly affordable with current energy prices and increasing unaffordability 
representing a key area of concern for publics (e.g. 73% are (fairly or very) concerned 
about electricity and gas becoming unaffordable). 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant: “I generally worry about the price because the way things are going, is 
like you know you wake up the following day and the energy company will just tell 
me that there will be an increase in price, and there is nothing you can do about 
it” 
13 
 
UK Energy Research Centre                                            UKERC/WP/FG/2014/006 
 
 
In this sense public formulations of the problem that necessitates energy system 
change do converge with policy framings but only in a quite limited way. In terms of 
perspectives on responses and solutions public visions also converge with policy on 
some of the key areas, specifically reductions in fossil fuels, increases in RETS 
(though publics are concerned about the socio-environmental sustainability of 
biofuels), and the need for reductions in demand. There are also clear differences 
between public views and policy framings.  In terms of supply, publics favour greater 
levels of RETs and lower fossil fuels and remain at best uncertain about the 
development and use of CCS. This is explicable when we look back at the problem 
framings - since climate change forms only one small part of public views on what 
requires changing, CCS does not work to address the problem framing as it arises 
from publics.  There are also differences in terms of nuclear energy, which forms a 
much smaller part of public scenarios than the main policy scenario. In particular our 
evidence indicates that support is only likely to extend to replacement rather than 
expansion (see Demski et al. 2013).   
 
Publics are also open to reductions in demand but they do highlight the need for 
policy support in line with current policy discourse. Different however, is the greater 
emphasis in public visions on regulatory approaches to change, while the policy 
focus remains on market mechanisms. Market mechanisms were widely held by 
those involved in our research to be unlikely to achieve the scale of change required 
because of the high levels of uptake necessary.  
 
The nature of problem framings has clear implications for the solutions that are 
proposed. For example, when the focus is on climate change as a problem framing, 
CCS arguably represents a suitable solution. However, when the problem framing 
situates climate change as just one element of wider concerns about environmental 
degradation, CCS no longer constitutes a solution as the other forms of 
environmental degradation associated with fossils fuels continue to be an issue.  A 
further example arises with regards to the narrow framing of the problem in terms of 
climate change, energy security and cost effectiveness. This excludes issues that 
were central to public framings relating to perceptions of the relationship between 
private, public and civil spheres in the energy sector and responsibility for change.  
 
As discussed previously, energy markets were perceived as not operating in the ways 
that they should - this has implications for the acceptability of some responses in 
terms of financing energy system transitions, such as through adding costs on to 
bills. As such there are interconnections between the uncertainties that are present 
in energy governance (e.g. which kinds of policy are developed) and those 
concerning public acceptability. For instance, a policy that introduces market reforms 
which address the issues publics view as existing within current energy markets 
could represent an important step in building public support and addressing 
uncertainty about public acceptability.  
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A final important area of divergence between public values and policy framings 
concerns the process of change itself and how change is undertaken. This connects 
centrally with the public value of Improvement and Quality – embedded within this is 
a focus on long-term trajectories for change toward systems that are broadly 
commensurate with the values as an interconnected whole. Public responses (and 
therefore social uncertainties) arise precisely because people do not just care about 
one or two things, but an interlinked set of concerns that draw in a range of societal, 
environmental and technical issues. Although one or two concerns may be 
particularly salient at a point in time or context (e.g. energy price increases), these 
do not make the others unimportant. This dynamic and contingent nature of public 
responses is central to the emergent indeterminacy that can be seen to characterise 
public acceptability.  
 
In this context, the notion of a long-term vision gives the space through which we 
find latitude for compromise on current and short-medium term system 
configurations and for addressing the values, which are inherently aspirational. 
There is significant room for compromise on some of the more challenging aspects 
of divergence (such as nuclear and to a lesser extent CCS) if these are proposed in 
the context of a longer term trajectory toward the kinds of change that is 
commensurate with public values. 
 
Public configurations of the challenge in this regard did not focus on time points, 
such as 2050, but on the core challenge of setting the UK on a trajectory toward 
fundamental change of the kind that is normatively desirable. This was tied to an 
underlying set of understandings regarding what constituted a ‘transition’. Crucially, 
negative perspectives with regards to CCS and biofuels were often predicated on a 
view that these were non-transitions in the sense that they did not address the root 
causes of problems and represented means for sustaining aspects of systems viewed 
as problematic (e.g. dependency on fossil fuels; global trading of finite and limited 
resources). 
 
Pragmatic views arising from people’s understanding of how the world currently is 
mean that within longer term trajectories there is, however, room for use of 
technologies and approaches that are less desirable but this is likely to fall apart 
where no long term vision is evident. This raises a particularly difficult challenge 
because current UK policy is focused on a market led solution that, by its very 
nature, does not embed a long term vision for change of a particular kind. 
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5. Concluding Discussion: Developing a 
publically acceptable energy future 
 
The analysis here is indicative of a far narrower set of framings within policy than 
those that arise from public perspectives. This corresponds with arguments central 
to the work of Leach et al. (2010; 2007) that there is a pervasive tendency – 
supported by professional, institutional and political pressures – for powerful actors 
and institutions to ‘close down around particular framings, committing to particular 
pathways that emphasise maintaining stability and control’ (Leach et al., 2010). In 
this respect Leach et al. (2010) argue that addressing the full implications of 
dynamics and incomplete knowledge or indeterminacy requires an ‘opening up to 
methods and practices that involve flexibility, diversity, adaptation, learning and 
reflexivity, and an alternative politics of sustainability that highlights and supports 
alternative pathways’. Building from this set of assertions, we argue that such an 
‘opening up’, which makes room for a greater level of reflexivity about and inclusion 
of different framings within policy, is likely to be central to the success of policy-
making in terms of its ability to be responsive to uncertainties concerning public 
perspectives and acceptability.   
 
In this regard we suggest that by incorporating understanding of the deeper values 
that people draw on to formulate their views about system change within policy 
development a much wider framing of the salient issues and thus responses 
becomes visible. This offers at least two key important possibilities for enhancing 
capacities to engage with uncertainties associated with public views and 
acceptability. 
 
First, it offers possibilities with regards to anticipating shocks and uncertainties with 
regards to the evolution of public views as things change and emerge in any given 
context. While examining public preferences gives insight into key aspects of change 
that are largely favoured by publics (i.e. significant development of renewable energy 
technologies, combined with a move away from fossil fuels, and reductions in energy 
demand), we know that there remains significant contingency around how 
developments play out in particular contexts; for example with regard to local 
contestation about infrastructure development or the enactment of behavioural 
change in the area of energy demand reduction. The value system can be used as a 
basis for both understanding why contestation has arisen around any particular set 
of developments and thus allow for greater purchase on how to resolve conflicts.  
 
Second, and, perhaps more importantly, the values system provides possibilities for 
engaging with uncertainties by offering insights important for developing a coalition 
for change. In contrast to the previous point this represents a more proactive form of 
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utility for public values and responses. We argue development of such a coalition is 
likely to necessarily involve broadening out from a narrow focus on climate change 
targets, security of energy supplies, and cost effectiveness to include wider aspects 
of concern such as the configurations of energy markets, affordability, other 
environmental concerns and so forth. In building from this basis in terms of problem 
framing, there is likely to be a far greater set of opportunities for convergence on 
possible solutions. Constructing a long term notion of where change is heading 
requires agreement on what needs to be changed in the first instance and agreeing 
on the definition of the imperative driving change.   If these broad guiding visions 
can be put in place then it is likely that greater room for compromise can be found.  
However, compromise is necessary on both sides – by both political elites and 
publics. Central to this is a reconfiguration of how public acceptability itself is 
understood.  
 
Within policy, the understandings of what public acceptability actually means are in 
themselves extremely narrow, largely focusing on attaining public support for pre-
defined and overwhelmingly technological solutions. We argue here, however, that to 
develop something akin to public acceptability requires engagement with a much 
wider set of both problem and solution framings. Rather than addressing the issue 
as one building of acceptance of and investment in expert and stakeholder defined 
pathways, there is a need to engage with public perspectives regarding how the 
problem itself and the pathways are constituted.  
 
The processes associated with understanding, managing and acting to reduce 
uncertainties with regards to public acceptability, are thus ones that in the first 
instance require a different formulation of what public acceptability means; i.e. that 
it does not simply concern persuading people to accept or support pre-defined 
problem framings and options. Building from this basis the task then becomes one 
of iteratively reformulating problem and solution understandings so that public 
perspectives are incorporated at the outset and form part of the thinking about 
pathways toward low-carbon systems. This is not to diminish or replace the role of 
expert understandings but to combine and expand the knowledge bases on which 
decisions are predicated. Equally, this does not mean that there can be no role for 
approaches which are less favourable from public perspectives (e.g. CCS) but that 
engaging publics now in open and inclusive processes that allow for the 
interrogation of different approaches to change is likely to be of high importance for 
acceptability of these more contentious options.    
 
In line with much previous work we have argued that when applied to social and 
policy problems, framing can not only construct a particular definition of the 
problem but also, whether explicitly or implicitly, of the kind of solutions that should 
be adopted. These processes may or may not be strategic, or even intentional, but 
are fundamentally political in their consequences (see Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; 
Stirling et al. 2007; Bickerstaff et al. 2008). This has particular implications in the 
context of energy system change because the nature of problem framing differs 
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considerably between policy and publics. Drawing on Leach et al. (2010), we have 
highlighted how opening up framings within policy is likely to be central to 
addressing the full implications of dynamics and incomplete knowledge or 
indeterminacy with regards to public acceptability. We argue that the values we have 
set out through our research offer a basis for such opening up if they are given 
proper consideration within both the constitution of problem framings and the 
subsequent responses. This could provide a basis for a coalition for change which 
could, in turn, open up possibilities for compromise within public responses with, for 
example, less desirable aspects of system change (such as some continuation of 
fossil fuels within the system) becoming more acceptable in a context where there is 
a greater sense that the full range of responses and concerns are being considered, 
and where there is a clear long-term vision for change around which diverse publics 
can coalesce.   
 
Problematically, at present the current governance context for energy system change 
does not appear to provide a strong basis for the development of such reflexive and 
inclusive reinventions. Public views are variously represented in media and political 
discourse about energy systems as fickle, dogmatic, and irrational (e.g. see 
Guardian, 2014). This means that engagement with public values and the broader 
framings that they imply can often be at best very limited and at worst dismissive. In 
concluding we thus argue that a deeper level of engagement with public perspectives 
on energy system change is required in order to address the dynamic, indeterminate 
uncertainties that surround how public(s) will relate and respond to transitions. We 
suggest that by engaging more fully with public perspectives on system change the 
possibilities for developing public support, and realising a more sustainable future 
energy system, could be significantly enhanced.
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